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RUNNING THE GAUNTLET OF 
"UNDUE HARDSHIP"-THE 
DISCHARGE OF STUDENT 
LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Janice E. Kosel* 
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 established 
the National Defense Student Loan Program.1 National Defense 
Student Loans (now known as National Direct Student Loans or 
NDSL's) are funded through annual appropriations by Congress. 
The funds are distributed to institutions of higher education 
which agree to match every nine dollars of federal funds with 
one dollar of their own.2 An institution may make loans only to 
those students who demonstrate financial need.3 A student may 
borrow up to $12,000 for undergraduate and graduate school, 
but no more than $6,000 may be used for undergraduate stud-
ies." Repayment of NDSL's begins six months after the student 
ends study at the institution and may take up to ten y:ears.1I 
A second major governmental endeavor, the Federal Insured 
Student Loan Program, was enacted as part of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965 and implemented by legislation in 1968 and 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. A.B., 1968, University of California, 
Berkeley; J.D., 1971, University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall). 
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 421-429 (1976). Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 
§ 137(b), 86 Stat. 273, transferred current funding and other key provisions to the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified in scattered 
sections of '20 U.S.C.). Recent modifications of relevant NDSL statutes appear at 20 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1087cc-1087dd (Supp. 1980). 
2. 20 U.S.C.A. 1087cc(a)(2) (Supp. 1980). 
3. ld. § 1087dd(b). 
4. ld. § 1087dd(a)(2). 
5. ld. § 1087dd(c)(1)(A). 
457 
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1969.6 Unlike NDSL's, Federal Insured Student Loans (known 
as FISL's) are not funded by the federal government. Rather, 
private lenders are encouraged to make student loans which are 
guaranteed by the federal government.7 Although a borrower 
need not formally demonstrate financial need, he or she cannot 
borrow more than the difference between educational costs and 
other financial aid.8 A student may borrow up to $25,000 for 
graduate and undergraduate school, but no more than $12,500 
may be for undergraduate studies.9 Repayment of FISL's also 
begins six months after the student ends study at the institution 
and may take up to ten years.10 
By 1972, Congress had become concerned with the default 
rates on both NDSL's and FISL's. It perceived an abuse of the 
programs when students sought to discharge all of their educa-
tional debts in bankruptcy shortly after graduation from college. 
To remedy that supposed abuse, a proposal was made which ul-
timately was enacted as section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.11 Henceforth, such student loans would be dis-
6. ld. §§ 1071 to 1087-3a. 
7. S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4027, 4061. 
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1078(a)(2) (Supp. 1980). 
9. ld. § 1075(a)(2). 
10. ld. § 1077(a)(2)(B). 
11. Section 4-506(a)(8) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act provided that an educa-
tional debt could not be discharged in bankruptcy if "the first payment of any install-
ment thereof was due on a date less than five years prior to the date of the petition and 
if its payment from future income or other wealth will not impose an undue hardship on 
the debtor and his dependents." COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMM. 
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMlT1'ING A REPORT OF THE BANK-
RUPTCY COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137,93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II, at 140 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY 
COMMISSION]. While the proposed Bankruptcy Act continued to undergo revision, the 
essence of that section was enacted as section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1975, 
effective Oct. 1, 1977. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976). 
Section 439A of the Higher Education Act was repealed as of the date of the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Nov. 6, 1978. The effective date of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act was Oct. 1, 1979. For an eleven-month period between the date of enactment 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on Nov. 6, 1978 and its effective date on Oct. 1, 1979, 
there would be no federal statute providing for the nondischargeability of student loans. 
To remedy this inadvertant gap, a new section was added to the Bankruptcy Code by 
Act of Aug. 14, 1979, providing for the nondischargeability of student loans for a period 
of five years after they become due absent a showing of undue hardship. Pub. L. No. 96-
56, 43 Stat. 387 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979». For a discussion of 
the dischargeability of student loans between Nov. 6, 1978 and Aug. 1979, see Georgia 
Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. V. Broughton, 6 Bankr. Rep. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
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chargeable in bankruptcy only if "such loan first became due 
before five years. . . before the date of the filing of the petition; 
or . . . excepting such debt from discharge . . . will impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents 
"12 
This Article will first examine the legislative history of that 
provision and then review the case law implementing and inter-
preting the undue hardship exception. IS It is the author's thesis 
that the absence of a single coherent legislative theory for the 
nondischargeability of student loans has inevitably led to a num-
ber of disparate judicial interpretations. 
Regardless of the underlying rationale, a survey of the case 
law indicates that the courts have interpreted the undue hard-
ship exception quite stringently. Generally, they have discharged 
student loans only if the debtor can scarcely maintain a minimal 
lifestyle after prudent allocation of income and employment ef-
fort. Even this hard line approach ignores the undue hardship 
exception already built into the student loan program-the abil-
ity of the administrator to grant unlimited forbearance in the 
event of financial distress.1-' In light of this second undue hard-
ship exception, it is difficult to envision any circumstances in 
which a student loan should be discharged. Yet a number of dis-
charges have been granted. 
Legislative revision of section 523(a)(8) is essential, not sim-
ply to give a consistent meaning to that provision, but to ensure 
12. 11 u.s.c. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. ill 1979). 
13. A number of sanctions have been imposed on the student loan debtor who files 
bankruptcy that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Comment, Skipping Out 
on Alma MateI': Some Problems Involving the Collection of Federal Student Loans, 15 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 317 (1980) (denial of transcripts, additional student aid, en-
rollment at former institution, and admission to the bar); Comment, A Fresh Start 
through Bankruptcy: Fact or Frustration for the Student Loan Debtor, 2 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 365 (1979) (denial of transcript); In re Wave, 9 Bankr. Rep. 24 (W.D. Mo. 
1981) (denial of transcript is an illegal collection effort under section 362(a)(1) of the 
new Bankruptcy Code); Application of Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979) (upholding 
denial of admission to the bar not because of the bankruptcy filing but on the basis of 
the applicant's moral character as reflected in his lack of financial responsibility and his 
default on the student loans prior to the filing); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 
1267 (8th Cir. 1977) (private school's refusal to issue a transcript because of failure to 
pay student loans discharged in bankruptcy is a legal means of inducing debtor to make 
payment under the Bankruptcy Act). 
. 14. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(c) (1976). 
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the fulfillment of a societal goal greater than the bankruptcy ob-
jective of a fresh start for the individual debtor-namely, the 
maintenance of educational loan programs for future generations 
of students. In order to facilitate that objective, student loans 
should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy regardless of the 
debtor's circumstances. 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 523(a)(8) 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 does not clearly refer to the rationale underlying the enact-
ment of section 523(a)(8), but the Senate Report does indicate 
an intent to follow prior law.1Is Turning then to its predecessor, 
the purpose of section 439(A) of the Higher Education Act of 
197516 was explained as follows: 
The amendment was adopted in the light of testi-
mony that the bankruptcy rate involving student 
loans has increased significantly in the last several 
years and that in some areas of the country stu-
dents are being counseled on filing for bankruptcy 
to discharge their obligations to repay guaranteed 
student loans. 
The Committee notes that in most circum-
stances a student may leave school with several 
thousand dollars in student loans and no assets, 
thereby making the student technically eligible to 
declare bankruptcy. The amendment, by waiting 
five years, would offer a more re~tic view on the 
student's ability to repay a student loan.17 
Thus, the articulated purpose of this legislation was to pre-
vent a specific abuse, the filing of bankruptcy shortly after grad-
uation for the primary purpose of discharging student loans. 
Proponents of the legislation produced statistics compiled by 
the Office of Education showing a rapid and dramatic increase in 
the incidence ot student loan bankruptcies. IS As one member of 
Congress noted: "I feel certain that a problem has been identi-
15. "[It] follows generally current law and excerpts [sic] from discharge stuaent 
loans until such loans have been due and owing for five years." S. REP. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865. 
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976). 
17. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13.-14 (1976). 
18. The statistics demonstrate the rise in student loan bankruptcies. 
{ 
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tied, a problem of serious proportions and consequence, but one 
which has not yet reached catastrophic or crippling magnitude. 
Now is the time to act to prevent it from becoming so. "19 
The Congressman's fears for the future were based on two 
factors. Increasing numbers of students had taken out loans over 
the past decade so that the total dollar impact on the student 
loan program of even a constant rate of bankruptcy filings would 
increase dramatically.20 Moreover, in all likelihood the incidence 
of student loan bankruptcy filing would continue its geometric 
ascent. The moral stigma attached to bankruptcy was appar-
ently on the decline. And the incidence of bankruptcy in feder-
ally administered student loan programs was not yet as high as 
that in state-run programs "due in large part to the lack of pur-
suit of defaulters. When the pressure to meet obligations begins 
to be applied in the Federal programs, I think it is safe to pre-
dict a dramatic rise in bankruptcy filings in that program 
alsO."21 
In reference to statistics marshaled by the Office of Ed~ca­
tion, the Congressman confidently stated that "this is clear evi-
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Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1072-73 (statement of Ed-
ward T. York, Jr.) and 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach) (Jan. 29, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings]. 
19. Id. at 1091 (testimony of Representative John N. Erlenboro). 
20. Id. at 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach). Annual expenditures for NDSL's 
had increased from 40 million in fiscal year 1960 to 345 million in fiscal year 1975. An-
nual expenditures for FISL's had increased from 29 million in fiscal year 1968 to 334 
million in fiscal year 1975. American Statistical Index, Digest of Education Statistics, 
4564-1, at 172 (1979). 
21. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1088 (statement of Representative John N. 
Erlenborn). 
5
Kosel: Student Loans in Bankruptcy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
462 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:457 
spect to the discharge of Federally guaranteed student loans. "22 
Others were not so easily convinced. Indeed, the legislative his-
tory is replete with statistics justifying their skepticism. Focus-
ing solely on percentage increases in bankruptcy filings had led 
to a misconception of the nature and extent of the current prob-
lem. Although $17 million had been paid on guaranteed student 
loan bankruptcy claims during fiscal years 1969-1975, over $7 
billion had been loaned during that period.28 Only two-tenths of 
one percent of the loans made, involving less than three-tenths 
of one percent of the dollars loaned, had been discharged in 
bankruptcy.24 As one bankruptcy judge concluded, "bankruptcy 
losses do not appear to present any great threat to the [student 
loan] program."25 
Indeed, the type of bankruptcy abuse specifically contem-
plated by Congress was virtually nonexistent. Less than one stu-
dent borrower in two hundred had declared bankruptcy.26 The 
specific abuse Congress sought to prevent could be inferred only 
from that small fraction of these bankruptcy filings where edu-
cationalloans were the predominant debt.27 In sum, apart from 
a few well publicized horror stories,28 there was little evidence to 
suggest that the overwhelming majority of student loan bank-
ruptcies were anything but legitimate. 
No data exists describing the situation of those 
declaring bankruptcy. How many of those former 
students completed their education and received 
their degrees? How many were employed when 
22. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 157 (1977). 
23. Hearings, supra note 18, at 981 (statement of Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1975). 
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 161 (1977). 
25. Hearings, supra note 18, at 981 (statement of Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1975). 
26. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1976). 
27. A survey conducted by the General Accounting Office indicated that in approxi-
mately 20% of the bankruptcy cases involving guaranteed student loans, over 80% of the 
debtor's total indebtedness was attributable to educational loans. H.R. REP. No. 595, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977). A random sample analyzed by the Comptroller General 
of student loan borrowers who petitioned for bankruptcy indicated that educational 
debts averaged only $4,138 of $14,115 total unsecured debts-less than 30%. Id. at 139. 
Only 35% of student loan borrrowers who petitioned for bankruptcy scheduled educa-
tional debts accounting for 60% or more of theirnonpriority unsecured debts. Id. at 144. 
28. The classic example was a Stanford University student who secured student 
loans in order to obtain an undergraduate degree in business, a master's degree in engi-
neering, and a law degree. Two weeks after leaving school he filed a bankruptcy petitioIl; 
listing a total indebtedness of $17,275-all in student loans. Hearings, supra note 18, at 
1073-74 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.). 
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they filed for bankruptcy, and for how long? How 
many felt obligated to take out student loans they 
didn't originally want, or in amounts greater than 
thoughtful credit counseling would have advised? 
How many found work, but in occupations far re-
moved in form and earning power from their 
mortgaged educational careers?29 
463 
Opposition to the nondischargeability provision was wide-
spread.30 One critic denounced the proposal to alter the dis-
chargeability of student loans as "a discriminatory remedy for a 
'scandal' which exists primarily in the imagination. "31 Another 
condemned the proposal as "a serious allegation against a whole 
generation."32 "Treating students, all students, as though they 
were suspected frauds and felons is no substitute for improving 
the administration of the program. "33 
The exception to discharge for student loans was viewed by 
critics as contrary to one of the most basic principles of bank-
ruptcy law-equality of treatment for all debts and c~editors. 
[I]t treats educational loans precisely as the law 
now treats loans incurred by fraud, felony, and al-
imony dodging. No other legitimately contracted 
consumer loan, applied to a legitimate un-
dertakin [sic], is SUbjected to the assumption of 
criminality which this provision applies to every 
educational loan. . . . [I]t is a direct, unmiti-
gated, slap in the face of every single student bor-
rower in the nation. It assumes that borrower's 
bad intentions, and deprives him of a right that 
every other citizen has available to him if he 
29. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 161 (1977). 
30. Among the opponents were the House Judiciary Committee, American Bankers 
Association, Consumer Bankers Association and National Student Lobby. H.R. REP. No. 
595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 132-33 (1977). 
31. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976) (statement of Representative 
James G. O'Hara). 
32. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1096 (testimony of Sheldon Steinbach, comment by 
Representative Don Edwards). 
33. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1976) (statement of Representative 
James G. O'Hara). Debts procured by fraud and criminal penalties are nondischargeable. 
11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2) (A), 523(a)(7). Relatively few cases have analyzed educational 
loans as debts obtained through false pretenses. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mwongozi, 4 Bankr. 
Ct. Dec. 120 (D. Ore. 1978) (decided under former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17(a)(2) [11 
U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976)]). 
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needs it.S4 
Proponents responded that educational loans are in fact dif-
ferent from most loans, and therefore merit special treatment. 
Conventional loans typically are made on the basis of a financial 
analysis of the borrower, his or her assets, and present income. 
Conventional lenders frequently require security or a cosigner to 
guarantee repayment of the debt. In contrast, student borrowers 
rarely have present income or property and their educational 
loans are neither cosigned nor secured. In a sense, student loans 
represent a mortgage on the debtor's future because they are 
based on the supposition that the loan will be paid from future 
earnings attributable to the debtor's. education. Although se-
cured debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy, the debtor must 
forfeit the collateral; in order to keep the property, the debtor 
must reaffirm the debt.35 Because student loan debtors cannot 
surrender an intangible asset like an education, they have no 
choice; they must commit future earnings to the repayment of 
student loans. 
Moreover, proponents argued, nondischargeability of partic-
ular types of debts in bankruptcy was not without precedent. 
For example, taxes are not dischargeable until three years after 
they first become due.36 One commentator has written that the 
philosophical basis for the exception to discharge for taxes is the 
high moral claim of the government as the representative of the 
public.3'1 That policy applied equally well to student loans. 
"When something is wrong with or threatens the Federally In-
sured and Guaranteed Student Loan Programs, immediate and 
thoughtful attention must be given lest we run the risk of losing 
or impairing the efficiency of key engredients in our system of 
financing higher education."38 Later, a court would more clearly 
articulate the political and practical objectives behind the 
nondischargeability of student loans-" 'the preservation of a 
program that benefits many thousands of borrowers which, if 
eliminated, would leave students with virtually no institutional 
34. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976) (emphasis in original). 
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 722 (Supp. n 1978). 
36. Id. § 523(a)(1). 
37. 1 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 242 (2d ed. 1978). 
38. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1087 (statement of Representative John N. 
Erlenborn). 
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source of borrowable funds.' "89 
In the end, of course, the proponents of the amendment 
prevailed. Congress voted to make student loans nondischarge-
able until five years had elapsed from the date the educational 
loan first became due. The five year moratorium was apparently 
selected on the basis of both factual and equitable considera-
tions. Statistics indicated that the average time which elapsed 
between the last student loan and the bankruptcy filings ranged 
between thirty months"'o and forty-one mon~.41 Moreover, 
bankruptcies occuring after the five year period did not have the 
same indicia of abuse. If payment were not made within that 
time period, it was more likely that the educational loan had not 
.materially contributed to the increased income stream; because 
the promise of higher education was unfulfilled, it seemed more 
appropriate to forgive the debt. 
In effect, the moratorium was intended to operate as a pre-
sumption that any bankruptcy filed within five years was done 
with the primary purpose of discharging a student loan. No pro-
vision was made for the direct rebuttal of that presumption of 
abuse. Instead, in order to alleviate the concern that the amend-
ment would unduly impair the traditional goal of bankruptcy-a 
fresh start for the debtor-provision was made for the dis-
charge ability of student loans if "undue hardship on the debtor 
and his dependents would otherwise result." 
The undue hardship exception was clearly a compromise 
measure. It provoked little comment in the legislative history. 
Reflecting on the diverse concerns expressed by his colleagues, 
one member of Congress voiced the belief that "this provision 
. . . will enable referees to distinguish between individuals who 
have contrived to secure an unjust enrichment through the oper-
ation of the bankruptcy law and those who have realistically 
39. In re Payton, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,073 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 1978). In 
Payton, the court rejected the argument that the provision for nondischargeability of 
student loans violated the equal protection clause because it was rationally related to the 
achievement of that legitimate governmental purpose. 
, 40. This figure was derived from a June 1975 random survey of guaranteed student 
loan bankruptcies under the New Jersey State Guarantee Loan Program. Hearings, 
supra note 18, at 1074 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.). 
41. This figure was derived from an analysis of student loan bankruptcies conducted 
by the Comptroller General. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 142 (1977). 
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fallen on hard times and who deserve the benefits of the general 
'fresh start' policy of the act."42 Of necessity, . that distinction 
has been made, but in a different manner by each bankruptcy 
judge who has confronted the issue. For, as the court noted in 
Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation v. Bell,4s 
"the legislative history is . . . of little assistance in determining 
the underlying rationale of the exception to discharge for the 
purpose of applying it to facts clearly within its scope."" 
f' 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "UNDUE 
HARDSHIP" 
A. DISPARATE CRITERIA FOR THE DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOANS 
Extraordinary Hardship 
Focusing on the word "undue," the courts have consistently 
required a showing of economic difficulty that is not common to 
all recent graduates.41i Repayment of student loans almost al-
ways imposes an immediate hardship on the debtor. The debts 
of recent graduates generally vastly outnumber their assets. Yet 
a simple comparison of assets and liabilities is misleading, for it 
ignores a prime factor, earning power. Over time, an increased 
earning capacity will normally be generated to alleviate that 
temporary hardship. If the former student has secured employ-
42. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach). 
43. 5 Bankr. Rep. 461 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
44. [d. at 462. One commentatof has attempted to fathom the legislative rationale 
and thereby provide guidance for the implementation of the undue hardship exception. 
Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (1978). 
45. See, e.g., Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Packer, 9 Bankr. Rep. 
884 (D. Mass. 1981); Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Bell, 5 Bankr. Rep. 461, 
463 (N.D. Ga. 1980); New York State Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Brock, 4 Bankr. 
Rep. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); New York State Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Kohn, 
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases are consistent with the legislative 
history. "That which affects the group generally is not considered an undue hardship." 
Hearings, supra note 18, at 1092-93 (statement of Representative John N. Erlenbom). 
Under § 4-506(a)(8) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act, the burden was on the creditor 
to show that denial of discharge would not impose an undue hardship on the debtor. 
REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY COMM., supra note 11, at 136 (1973). However, the legisla-
tive history indicates that the provision as enacted in § 523(a)(8) was intended to be self-
executing; that is, the creditor is not required to file a complaint to determine nondis-
chargeability of a student loan. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 
[1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865. But see University of Alabama v. 
Wright, 7 Bankr. Rep. 197, 200 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (emphasis in original), suggesting "that 
the burden is on the creditor to show that the loan first be~ame due before five years, 
before the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. Otherwise the loan is presumed 
discharged." 
10
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ment in the field of endeavor for which he or she is trained and 
there is a reasonable probability that income will increase in the 
future, present hardship is neither unique nor unexpected. Con-
fronted by this situation in Bell, the court noted that "[w]hile 
the debtor's budget will undoubtedly be tight for the foreseeable 
future, that is a common rather than an undue hardship."46 If 
there are no factors which indicate that the bankrupt's plight 
differs from the great majority of student loan debtors, the un-
due hardship discharge will be denied. 
Self-Imposed Hardship-Maintenance of a Minimal Lifestyle 
In other cases, while the debtor's economic straits may be 
more severe than those of most student loan debtors, that situa-
tion is due to circumstances well within the debtor's control. Fu-
ture repayment difficulties may have been engendered by volun-
tary reaffirmation of 'debt,4'1 unwise purchases,48 other 
improvident expenditures,49 or even laziness and obesity.50 If the 
46. Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Bell, 5 Bankr. Rep. 461, 463 (N.D. Ala. 
1980). 
47. See, e.g., In re Hayes, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,065 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 1979) 
(debtor reaffirmed a debt secured by a second car; monthly payments on the car were 
$118 while the minimum payment on federally insured student loans would be approxi-
mately $53 per month), and Vermont Student Assistance Corp. v. Ewell, 1 Bankr. Rep. 
311, 313 (D. Vt. 1979) (debtor reaffirmed a debt of $3,750 to a credit union holding a 
security interest in a car worth $1,000 because his wife was fond of the vehicle and 
wanted to retain it). 
48. See, e.g., Hayman v. Wilmington Trust Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 932 (S.D. Fla. 
1978) (debtor incurred monthly payments of $88 on a car purchased after filing 
bankruptcy). 
49. See, e.g., Price v. United States, 1 Bankr. Rep. 768, 769 (D. Haw. 1980) (debtor 
sent her three children to private school at a tuition of $2,700 per year); In re De Ange-
lis, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,082 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1979) (the fact that the debtor's 
rental expenses absorbed a substantial portion of her monthly income because she pre-
ferred "the advantages of a better neighborhood over a more budget-conscious lodging" 
was not taken into account in determining hardship); In re Townsend, BANKR. L. REP. 
(CCH) 11 67,140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1978) (debtor made contributions to various churches 
of $75-100 monthly while the state would agree to accept monthly payments of only $10-
20 on the student loans). 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Conard, 6 Bankr. Rep. 151, 152 (W.D. Ky. 1980). 
Debtor described himself as "overweight" and testified that his physical appearance 
"turns off a lot of people." The court denied a hardship discharge, noting that 
corpulence is a condition which may swiftly diminish with 
continued impecuniosity. 
Enlightened self-interest would seem to suggest the virtue 
of a vigorous and energetic search for a proper workshop in 
which to use those intellectual tools which have been well 
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debtor had exercised greater prudence, the money for the repay-
ment of student loans would have been available. When con-
fronted by debtor extravagance, the courts have consistently de-
nied the undue hardship discharge. Their rationale was clearly 
stated by the court in Hayman v. Wilmington Trust Company . .61 
"The discretion given this court to permit discharge during 
those first five years to prevent 'undue hardship on the debtor 
and his' dependents' is not intended to shelter the bankrupt 
from self-imposed hardship from a reluctance to live within his 
means."52 Or, as the court rather bluntly noted in Vermont Stu-
dent Assistance Corporation v. Ewell,53 
[t]he process of rehabilitation entails the exercise 
of prudence on the part of the debtor. He must 
not cast caution to the winds. Unfortunately, the 
bankrupt failed to take heed. . . . [T]he money 
required to payoff ... [the car] could have very 
well been used in the future to payoff part of the 
student loan. This in itself would tend to deprive 
him of the protection of "undue hardship".M 
Although phrased somewhat moralistically, the position adopted 
by the courts appears to coincide with the legislative intent to 
discharge student loans only in exceptional circumstances. Mod-
est inconvenience occasioned by personal lifestyle choices is not 
undue hardship. Discharging student loans in such circum-
stances would reward extravagance and penalize frugality. 
In all other cases of alleged undue hardship, the consensus 
of the courts has broken down, precisely because of the ambigu-
Id. at 153. 
honed at federal expense. Productivity is preferable to living 
off the substance of the land. 
In Virginia Educ. Loan Auth. v. Archie, 7 Bankr. Rep. 715 (E.D. Va., 1980), the 
debtor left school prior to receiving a degree because she was depressed and had a very 
low self-esteem due to an obesity problem. She had a surplus of income over expenses of 
$37.13, even though she had extraordinarily high telephone bills and clothing expenses, 
and planned to expend funds on a weight reduction program. The court denied the un-
due hardship discharge, seeing no reason why under careful budgeting the debtor would 
not be able to repay the student loans. Id. at 718-19. 
51. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 932 (S.D. Fla. 1978). 
52. Id. at 933. The debtor had a total indebtedness of $3,957. Student loans com-
prise $2,600 of this total. I d. at 932. 
53. 1 Bankr. Rep. 311 (D. Vt. 1979). 
54. Id. at 313. The debtor scheduled student loans of $8,400 and other debts of 
$4,650, including an obligation of $3,750 which he reaffirmed. Id. at 312-13. 
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ity of the legislative history. As one judge noted: 
It is regrettable that Congress shed so inade-
quate a spotlight on the exculpating phrase "un-
due hardship". What can be gleaned is that the 
hardship is to be found in the exceptional case 
and must be based on something more than in-
ability to pay. It is also regrettable that so much 
is therefore left to the individual view of each 
judge who, after all, brings the sum of who and 
what he was, who he has become, and what he 
sees through his own eyes to this basically dis-
agreeable task.1I1I 
469 
A majority of courts generally have been sympathetic in 
finding undue hardship to exist where. unexpected difficulties 
triggered the debtor's financial problems. In so doing, they have 
relied to a great extent on the absence of the specific abuse high-
lighted in the legislative history. Moreover, as one member of 
Congress pointedly observed: "This requirement recognizes that 
in some circumstances the debtor, because of factors beyond his 
reasonable control, may be unable to earn an income adequate 
both to meet the living costs of himself and his dependents and 
to make the educational debt payments."116 
The present and potential hardship, however, must be of 
exceptional degree to conform to the guidelines articulated in a 
communique from the Bankruptcy Commission. 
In order to determine whether nondis-
chargeability of the debt will impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor, the rate and amount of 
his future resources should be estimated reason-
ably in terms of ability to obtain, retain, and con-
tinue employment and the rate of pay that can be 
expected. Any unearned income or other wealth 
which the debtor can be expected to receive 
should be taken into account. The total amount 
of income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its 
receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor 
and his dependents, at a minimal standard of liv-
ing within their management capability as well as 
55. New York Higher Educ. Servo v. White, 6 Bankr. Rep. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(citation omitted). 
56. REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY COMM., supra note 11, at 140. 
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to pay the educational debt.~7 
Unforeseen Circumstances 
Most courts have applied the standard of the Bankruptcy 
Commission quite stringently, focusing on the nature of the 
scheduled debts and the circumstances that led to the filing of 
the petition, as well as the debtor's prospective ability to main-
tain a "minimal" standard of living following the discharge of 
other debts in bankruptcy. Thus, an undue hardship discharge 
was granted to student loan debtors in the following rather 
classical hardship circumstances: 
-The debtor's wife had contracted a rare disease which 
had generated major medical bills and had made impossible 
her present, and perhaps future, employment. The debtor's 
take home pay was less than the family needed for living 
expenses. He had no real or personal property of any conse-
quence. The court determined that the existence of medical 
problems coupled with the lack of income constituted 
grounds for a finding of undue hardship, noting that there 
was no apparent abuse of the bankruptcy system and that 
the debtor had clear need for a fresh start.~8 
-The debtor was diabetic and had no equity in his house-
hold furnishings or his auto. He was paying child support 
for the child of his first marriage and was in the midst of a 
divorce from his second wife. Although there was no evi-
dence of extravagant living, the debtor was unable to keep 
current with his bills on his present income and had little 
prospect of increased income in the future. Educational 
loans constituted only fifteen to twenty percent of his total 
indebtedness. Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that requiring the debtor to repay the student loans 
would impose upon him an undue hardship. ~9 
-The debtor and her husband maintained a standard of 
living near the welfare level. She had recently terminated 
her employment due to pregnancy. She and her husband 
were unable to pay monthly expenses, much less the ex-
57. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1097 (testimony of Sheldon Steinbach quoting the 
Bankruptcy Commission Report) (emphasis added). 
58. In re Valentine, BANKR. L. REp. (CCH) 11 67,042 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 1979). 
59. In re Bonnington, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,009 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 1978). 
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isting medical bills they were obligated to pay as post-peti-
tion debts, and the future medical bills they would likely 
incur for their child who suffered from a respiratory prob-
lem. The court discharged a student loan of approximately 
$2,200.60 
-The debtor was the divorced, forty-five-year-old mother 
of four children, two of whom lived at home. She did not 
receive a college degree. She had suffered a series of ill-
nesses, including heart trouble and alcoholism, and needed 
surgery. When the debtor was employed, she could work 
only half a day because of her health problems. She was 
spending more per week than her income. Characterizing 
the situation as a "classic hardship case," the court dis-
charged the student loan.61 
-The debtor was a third generation depressive. At the 
time of the hearing, she was living on unemployment insur-
ance which was scheduled to run out in a month or two. 
Although her future was bleak, the court chose to focus on 
the present. ~'Not being clairvoyant, the Court can only 
base its decision upon what has happened in the past and 
what was happening at or about the time of the hearing .. 
Certainly, at this point in time, it would work an undue 
hardship on the bankrupt to pay the plaintiff. "62 
-The debtor completed only one semester of college and 
had not worked in the three years since she dropped out of 
school. She was a welfare recipient, pregnant, and in the 
midst of a divorce. She lived at home with her parents and 
planned to move out. She was partially disabled for an un-
certain duration from an automobile accident. The court 
discharged her $1,500 student loan. It represented less than 
thirty percent of her total unsecured debts.6s 
60. Connecticut Student Loan Foundation, Inc. v. Bagley, 4 Bankr. Rep. 248 (D. 
Ariz. 1980). 
61. Diaz v. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp., 5 Bank. Rep. 253, 253·54 (W.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
62. New York State Higher Educ. Servo Corp. v. Barrington, 7 Bankr. Rep. 267, 268 
(W.D.N.Y. 1980). 
63. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 
(E.D. Pa. 1979). 
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Failure of the Promise of Education-Increased Earning 
Capacity 
Although they might not have disagreed with the results in 
each of the classic cases above, other courts have cautioned that 
honest debtors who suffer extreme misfortune due to circum-
stances beyond their control do not automatically present cases 
of undue hardship. In so doing, they have followed the admoni-
tion of one member of Congress who noted that in such circum-
stances further inquiry should be undertaken.64 
If, after graduating from school, an individual be-
comes a paraplegic and earning capacity was im-
paired, there might be a finding of hardship. If 
the individual has had his or her earning capacity 
improved by virtue of the loan and other factors 
are not present, I don't think a hardship would 
exist.6~ 
The Congressman's comment reiterates the argument that 
student loans represent a claim of the government on the future 
earnings of the debtor, somewhat in the nature of a security in-
terest. The implicit promise of education is an increased earning 
capacity. If that promise is unfulfilled, the "collateral" is eco-
nomically valueless and the student loan debtor should be free 
to discharge the debt. But if the debtor is employed in a job 
related to his or her educational training, on a quantum meruit 
theory discharge should be denied regardless of the presence of 
unforeseen circumstances or the absence of any indicia of abuse. 
The court accepted this view in In re Garcia66 where the 
debtor had recently lost a child and the resulting medical ex-
penses were the primary reason for his bankruptcy filing. 
Debtor's assets consisted of household furniture and a car. His 
monthly living expenses consumed all but twenty-five dollars of 
his net income. Nonetheless, the court was unwilling to grant a 
harCiship discharge, noting that the debtor was employed as an 
internal revenue agent and was "young, intelligent, and 
healthy."67 Unforeseen circumstances had not impaired his abil-
64. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1092-93 (testimony of Representative John N. 
Erlenborn). 
65.Id. 
66. 1 Bankr. Rep. 253 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
67. [d. at 254. 
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ity to repay the student loan because they had not negated his 
earning capacity. I 
Even in the absence of actual employment in a field related 
to one's education, a 'potential for such employment, however 
remote, may negate the finding of undue hardship. For example, 
the court in New York State Higher Education Services Corpo-
ration v. Henry denied the discharge of $4,500 in student loans 
to a debtor who had received a masters degree in social work." 
She was unemployed and lived with her brother and his family. 
The debtor was unsuccessful in obtaining a job, even though she 
had applied for fifty positions in the social work "area. The court 
pointedly observed that "her potential for future gainful em-
ployment is far from bleak. . . [T]here are hundreds of organi-
zations in New York City which have positions in her field to 
which she has not applied, and she apparently has made no ef-
fort to seek employment outside her chosen field. "69 • 
In many instances, however, the promise of education has 
not been fulfilled. Increased earnings in the chosen field were 
not forthcoming. In such circumstances, most courts will grant a 
hardship discharge, provided the debtor maintains the ~imal 
lifestyle envisioned in the report of the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion.70 For example: 
-Although the debtor had a degree in social work, she was 
unable to hold a regular job. What she could hope to earn 
would be minimal at best. She had no property. Noting the 
lifestyle standard suggested in the report of the Bankruptcy 
CODmllssion, the court found the requisite undue hardship 
and discharged the student loan.71 
-The debtor had spent five years in college but had re-
ceived no degree. He had no assets and his net income as a 
part-time truck driver was expended as soon as it came in. 
Noting that the debtor's "education was valueless in ap-
68. 4 Bankr. Rep. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
69. Id. at 497-98. In part, the harshness of the opinion may be explained by the 
timing of the bankruptcy petition-two months after the student loan became due. See 
the discussion of Littel in the text accompanying notes 84-87 infra for a more sympa:' 
thetic approach when employment in the chosen field is unrealistic. 
70. See text accompanying note 57 supra. 
71. In re Matthews, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,049 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 1979). 
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praising his future income," the court discharged the stu-
dent loan.72 
-The debtor enrolled in a number of accounting courses, 
but his education did not improve his position in his em-
ployment as a policeman. It did not appear that his earning 
capacity in the foreseeable future would be enhanced to any 
extent because of the educational value of the courses. M-
ter bankruptcy, the debtor's financial resources were insuffi-
cient to support him and his dependents at a break-even 
level. Again, the student loan was discharged.73 
-The debtor was a CETA employee who had never com-
pleted college. She and her children resided with her fam-
ily. In dictum, the court stated that the debtor had no pre-
sent ability to make payments and noted that "[o]nly by 
divining a rosy future unsupported by known facts could 
the plaintiff argue any ability to repay this loan in the fu-
ture."7. Because the loan was a direct loan rather than a 
federally insured or guaranteed loan, it was unnecessary to 
make a hardship determination. If it were necessary, the 
outcome is clear.75 
-The debtor was a certified teacher but her efforts to ob-
tain a job in her field had been 'futile. Since receiving her 
certification, she had held a number of dead-end jobs, ulti-
mately working as a substitute teacher. The court took into 
account her efforts to obtain work, the job obtained, her 
present level of employment, and her current level of in-
come, which was unable to sustain her above the poverty 
level. The court determined that she had little chance in 
the near future of obtaining a full-time teaching job which 
would significantly alter her present circumstances. "[I]f 
the past is any guide to the future, the bankrupt's prospects 
are far from rosy."76 The court clearly articulated its inter-
pretation of the legislative purpose behind the nondis-
72. In re Gangloff, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,007 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1978). 
73. In re Fonzo, 1 Bankr. Rep. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
74. Daemen College v. Thomas, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 796, 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). 
75. Id. at 796, 797. 
76. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp. v. Moore, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 791, 792 
(W.D.N.Y. 1978). Even though the debtor had a $30 miscellaneous item in her budget, 
U[s]he [had] stretched her budget by not eating, not replacing clothes and doing without 
many of the necessities of life"; therefore, the student loan was discharged. Id. 
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chargeability of student loans. 
In essence, Congress is saying to the Bankruptcy 
Courts that they are Courts of Equity and if they 
are satisfied that the repayment of student loans 
within the purview of the statute would work an 
inappropriate, inequitable burden upon the bank-
rupt or their [sic] dependents then a discharge 
should be granted.77 
475 
In each of these cases, the debtor maintained a very mini-
mal lifestyle. If the debtor had been able to maintain a more 
moderate lifestyle,' albeit unenhanced by the mortgaged educa-
tion, the student loans may not have been discharged. 
The Government's High Moral Claim 
The legislative history indicates that the government is a 
special creditor with a high moral claim to repayment.78 Thus, 
even in the absence of benefit, courts may deny the discharge of 
stp.dent loans if there is a capacity for repayment. For example: 
-The debtor was dismissed from school after four years of 
college work in marketing and sales for failure to meet min-
imum academic requirements. At the time of trial, he was 
employed in a factory job. Although he had no wealth, the 
court noted that the debtor was "able bodied with no medi-
cal problems, no dependents and no excessive living ex-
penses. "79 The court denied the hardship discharge because 
the debtor maintained more than a minimal lifestyle, even 
though his job was unrelated to his education. • 
-The debtor was employed as a spot welder on an assem-
bly line. Her former husband had left the country and re-
fused to support the children, one of whom had a brain tu-
mor which required an elaborate operation. There was a 
substantial possibility that if additional treatment were re-
quired for her son, the debtor would be unable to continue 
her full-time employment. The court noted that she had 
proposed "an extremely tight but not unreasonable budget 
77. ld. 
78. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. 
79. Ohio v. Kirch, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 680, 682 (S.D. Ohio 1978). The debtor budgeted 
only $205-$85 for rent and $120 for food. 
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which appears to account for most normal expenditures."8o 
Nonetheless, the court denied the discharge, finding that 
payment by defeJ,Ted installments of twenty-five dollars per 
month, almost one-half of the unbudgeted income, "might 
be within the debtor's future economic abilities."81 
-The debtor was educated in the area of urban studies. 
She was thirty years old, healthy, and working part-time. 
The court noted that she "could keep life and limb together 
for herself and her daughter while not living opulently."82 
The court denied the hardship discharge, observing that 
"[i]t is no answer that the bankrupt is not presently em-
ployed in her chosen area. "8S The rationale of the court is 
abundantly clear, for in a footnote', it quoted from the 
statement of a Congressman in the legislative history: 
" '[W]hile I sympathize with . . . the many students who 
are unable to find employment which they believe to be 
commensurate with their level of education, I do not believe 
that this gives them a license to steal.' "tw 
B. THE MULTIFACETED TEST-"RUNNING THE GAUNTLET" 
The cases reflect four primary considerations in a decision 
to discharge a student loan: [1] a minimal lifestyle, [2] unfore-
seen circumstances, [3] a job unrelated to the debtor's studies, 
and [4]" the special status of the governmerit as creditor. The 
legislative history lends support to each theory of dischargeabili-
ty, but it fails to rank them in order of priority. As a result, 
bankruptcy courts generally have been unable to agree on the 
relative importance of each of these factors. For the most part, 
the courts have adopted an ad hoc approach, applying whatever 
test seemed to be appropriate to the circumstances. From the 
cases, only the following generalizations can be gleaned: 
[1] The undue hardship discharge will be denied if the 
debtor can make the scheduled repayments and still 
maintain a minimal lifestyle-regardless of the source 
80. Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aida Bd. v. MacPherson, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 950, 951 
(W.D. Wis. 1978). 
81. Id. 
82. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp. V. White, 6 Bankr. Rep. 26, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 28 n.5. 
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of income. 
[2] The undue hardship discharge will be denied if the 
debtor could make the scheduled repayments and still 
maintain a minimal lifestyle with a more prudent allo-
cation of income or effort to seek employment. 
[3] The undue hardship discharge will be granted if the 
debtor can maintain only a minimal lifestyle and there 
is no indicia of bankruptcy abuse-that is, if the 
financial problems are due to circumstances beyond the 
debtor's control and/or the debtor plainly received no 
economic benefit from his or her education. 
In Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. 
Johnson,s5 the court attempted to bring a semblance of order to 
the diverse interpretations of the undue hardship exception by 
formulating a multifaceted test that reflected the concerns ex-
pressed in the legislative history. The Johnson court's standards 
are remarkably in line with the above generalizations. In order 
to obtain an undue hardship discharge, the student loan debtor 
must run a gauntlet by passing [1] a "mechanical" test (minimal 
lifestyle), [2] a "good faith" test (prudent allocation of income 
and bona fide effort to secure employment), and [3] a "policy" 
test (absence of bankruptcy abuse and benefit of education).s8 
The Johnson court concluded: 
[A] debtor should be denied discharge of his 
student loan within the five year period after the 
debt matures, if either: 
(a) his future financial resources are most 
likely sufficient to finance repayment of the stu-
dent loan, and to support the debtor and his de-
pendents at or above the poverty level, or 
(b) but for the debtor's negligence or irre-
sponsibility he would be able to repay the loan 
without lowering his standard of living below the 
poverty level. 
A court should grant discharge of a student 
loan within five years after it becomes due, based 
on a finding that repayment of the loan would 
cause the debtor "undue hardship," where: 
(a) The debtor's future income and wealth, in 
85. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
86. Id. at 544-45. 
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the maximum foreseeable period allowed for re-
payment of the student loan, are likely to be in-
sufficient to fund the loan's repayment and to 
support the debtor and his dependents at a sub-
sistence level of living, and 
(b) either such hardship is due to circum-
stances beyond the debtor's control; or, 
(c) the circumstances clearly indicate that 
discharge of the student loan was not a dominant 
reason for filing bankruptcy, and that the debtor's 
earning prospects have not appreciably benefited 
from his education.8 'l 
Whichever test is applied, in the vast majority of cases, the 
undue hardship discharge will be denied. As one administrator 
of the student loan program noted: "In practically all cases, stu-
dent loan borrowers are young, healthy, have few obligations be-
yond the student loan, and have a lifetime of earning ability 
ahead of them. "88 
III. PARTIAL DISCHARGEABILITY AND UNLIMITED 
FORBEARANCE 
A number of additional considerations impinge upon the 
problem yet are rarely articulated in the decisions. For example, 
in many situations, the student and the educational institution 
are in pari delicto. The student's education did not enhance his 
or her earning capacity, but there was little reason to expect 
that it would. The court in Littel v. Oregon89 clearly took note of 
this abuse in the administration of the student loan program 
when it observed that the debtors may have been "inveigled into 
obtaining the loan and taking particular courses in college when 
the college authorities should have known that upon graduation 
from college the student had little chance of obtaining employ-
ment in that field. "90 
In Littel, both husband and wife had majored in Education 
and English with the thought of becoming teachers. Both had 
been unable to find teaching jobs which would utilize their col-
87.Id. 
88. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1099 (statement of John N. Erlenborn quoting the 
Director of the Virginia Loan Program). 
89. 6 Bankr. Rep. 85 (D. Ore. 1980). 
90. Id. at 88. 
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lege educations. The husband worked as a service station at-
tendant while his wife was employed as a CETA worker in a 
half-time position as a counselor at a community college. For 
these students, the promise of education was hollow. Only one of 
the four theories of nondischargeability would require them to 
repay the loan-the special status of the government as creditor. 
The court in Littel apparently considered that theory to be suffi-
cient. It was not persuaded that repayment was altogether im-
possible. Indeed, "by a reasonable additional effort, some pay-
ment could be made."91 Accordingly, the court directed each 
spouse to make payments of ten dollars a month on the student 
loans over a thirty-three and forty-eight month time period for a 
total repayment of approximately eleven percent of the princi-
pal.92 Thus, a theory of partial dischargeability was born.9s 
In United States v. Hemmen,9" the court fashioned a more 
unique formula for partial dischargeability. There the debtor 
was recently divorced, living with his parents, and receiving un-
employment benefits. His educational debts of approximately 
$4,000 amounted to less then one-fourth of his total unsecured 
debts. Although his present circumstances were modest, the 
court observed that "[t]his is a temporary lack of income rather 
than permanent."911 Therefore, the court was willing to supervise 
its judgment for a short term of years and discharge the student 
loans only if the debtor used his best efforts to find suitable em-
ployment and paid the student loan creditors all funds in excess 
of $3,600 per annum for a period of five years from the date of 
maturity of the last loan.96 
The creative solutions employed by the courts in Littel and 
Hemmen are commendable because they mesh nicely with the 
existing statutory scheme for the repayment of student loans. 
Under the student loan program, the lender has the option of 
unlimited forbearance to assist the borrower during a period of 
financial difficulty; payments may be reduced or deferred indefi-
91. Id. 
92.Id. 
93. Earlier, in Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aids Bd. v. MacPherson, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
950, 951 (W.D. Wis. 1978), the court had required the debtor to repay the principal 
amount of the student loan but forgave the interest. 
94. 7 Bankr. Rep. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1980). 
95. Id. at 67. 
96.Id. 
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nitely.97 In effect, an undue hardship provision was already built 
into the student loan program before the enactment of the bank-
ruptcy exception to discharge. 
In light of that second undue hardship prOVISIOn, a few 
courts have found it nearly impossible for a debtor to discharge 
a student loan.98 While it may be possible to show an inability to 
meet the normal repayment schedule, it is inordinately difficult 
to demonstrate an inability to pay even a nominal amount until 
circumstances improve. Most courts, however, have simply ig-
nored the possibility of unlimited forbearance.99 Both views 
render one of the undue hardship provisions devoid of meaning. 
It would seem that an accomodation of the dual statutory 
scheme could best be served through a rule of partial dis-
chirrgeability, requiring whatever repayment is feasible under 
the circumstances during the five year period following the ma-
turity of the student loan. 
IV. DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOANS THROUGH 
CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
ACTloO 
Perhaps the greatest paradox in the dischargeability of stu-
dent loans is revealed in a contrast between the provisions of 
Chapter 7, straight bankruptcy, and Chapter 13, the repayment 
plan. Chapter 13 contains a super discharge provision-section 
1328(a). While a number of debts such as student loans, traffic 
tickets,lOl and debts procured by fraudlo2 are nondischargeable 
in straight bankruptcy, all debts except taxes and family sup-
port obligations are dischargeable in Chapter 13. The intent of 
Congress in providing for greater dischargeability under Chapter 
13 than Chapter 7 was apparently to encourage debtors to at-
tempt a repayment plan.los But, once again, the legislative in-
tent has been distorted by judicial interpretation. 
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(c) (1976). 
98. See, e.g., Warren v. University of Dlinois, 6 Bankr. Rep. 233 (S.D. Fla. 1980) and 
Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Densmore, 8 Bankr. Rep. 308 (N.D. Ga. 1979). 
99. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
532, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
100. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. II 1978). 
101. Id. § 523(a)(7). 
102. Id. § 523(a)(2). 
103. See, e.g., In re Seman, 4 Bankr. Rep. 568, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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Under Chapter 13, a debtor's repayment plan need not pro-
vide for payment of all debts in full; unsecured creditors must 
simply receive more than they would in straight bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.lo• In many consumer bankruptcies, all of the debtor's 
assets are exempt; unsecured creditors receive nothing. As a re-
sult, a number of courts have applied the statutory test quite 
literally and have approved Chapter 13 repayment plans calling 
for nominal payments to unsecured creditors.lo5 
Thus, while student loans may be generally nondischarge-
able in straight bankruptcy, in a number of jurisdictions they 
are freely dischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings, regardless 9f 
hardship. The disparity in treatment between the student Joan 
debtor who files under Chapter 7 and the student loan debtor 
who files under Chapter 13 renders the legislature's and the 
court's rather stringent view of the undue hardship dis-
charge-on whatever theory-remarkably anomolous. 
CONCLUSION 
It is readily apparent that the courts are in hopeless disar-
ray with respect to the dischargeability of student loans in bank-
ruptcy. Their confusion is a function of the apparent dichotomy 
between the focus of the legislative history on bEplkruptcy abuse 
and Congress' articulated grounds for discharge, "undue hard-
ship." Until the legislative compromise that led to the introduc-
tion of the undue hardship exception, Congress' intent to deny 
discharge to those engaged in bankruptcy abuse was manifest. 
Deeming it impractical for the courts to independently ascertain 
the requisite fraud under section 523(a)(2) in each case, such. 
fraud was to be conclusively presumed if a bankruptcy were filed 
within five years of graduation. Yet the factual basis for such a 
wholesale presumption of fraud was nonexistent. Rather than 
abandoning that premise altogether, Congress reached "an un-
happy compromise with the undue hardship exception. It chose 
inappropriate language and then failed to furnish clear guide-
104. 11 u.s.c. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IT 1978). 
105. Compare United States v. Eichelberger, 6 Bankr. Rep. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1980) 
with In re Yee, 7 Bankr. Rep. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The immediate dividend to the credi-
tor may well be greater in a repayment plan than in straight bankruptcy proceedings. 
But the Chapter 7 student loan creditor is free to pursue its claim to repayment in full 
after bankruptcy because its debt is nondischargeable. The Chapter 13 student loan 
creditor is barred from further collection effort because its debt is discharged. 
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lines for judicial application. 
Not surprisingly, the absence of a single coherent theory for 
the discharge of student loans has led to a variety of judicial 
interpretations. Until the statutory language is clarified to more 
accurately reflect the legislative intent, student loan debtors will 
continue to be dependent on the unlimited, and generally unre-
viewable/o6 discretion of individual bankruptcy judges. 
The medley of concerns expressed in the legislative history 
suggest a number of possible revisions: 
[1] If the legislative concern is truly bankruptcy abuse, reli-
ance might be placed on section 523(a)(2). However, 
given the difficulty of establishing fraudulent intent at 
the time the loan is made, a conclusive presumption of 
abuse should arise if bankruptcy is filed within a given 
period of time and student loans comprise a given per-
centage of total indebtedness. In addition, either the 
super discharge provision of Chapter 13 should be 
amended to conform to this intent, or Chapter 13 
should be revised to require a repayment plan premised 
on the debtor's best efforts.107 
[2] If the legislative concern is the inequity inherent in the 
debtor retaining a valuable asset-education-without 
paying for it, student loans should be nondischargeable 
unless the debtor, after bona fide effort, is unable to se-
cure employment in a field related to his or her educa-
tion. Again, either the super discharge provision of 
Chapter 13 should be amended to conform to this in-
tent, or Chapter 13 should be revised to require a re-
payment plan premised on the debtor's best efforts. 
[3] If the legislative concern is the high moral claim of the 
government as a creditor and the maintenance of an 
ongoing program of educational assistance, student 
loans should be nondischargeable altogether. Again, ei-
ther the super discharge provision of Chapter 13 should 
106. Findings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. FED. R. CIV. P. 
52(a). 
107. A good faith effort was required of the Chapter 13 debtor by the technical 
amendments bill, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 191(a) (1979). 
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be amended to conform to this intent, or Chapter 13 
should be revised to require a repayment plan premised 
on the debtor's best efforts. 
[4] If the legislative concern is in fact true hardship, stu-
dent loans should be nondischargeable in the absence of 
unforeseen circumstances that will not be alleviated by 
the discharge of other debts. Despite the student loan 
creditor's option of unlimited forbearance in the event 
of hardship, a separate provision in the bankruptcy act 
to facilitate a fresh start for the debtor would be desir-
able. In addition, the possibility of a middle ground, 
partial dischargeability, should be clearly set forth in 
the legislation. Again, either the super discharge provi-
sion of Chapter 13 should be amended to conform to 
this intent, or Chapter 13 should be revised to require a 
repayment plan premised on the debtor's best efforts. 
A survey of the case law indicates that the majority of 
courts purport to apply the fourth standard-the present statu-
tory standard-albeit somewhat harshly. The tenor of the opin-
ions and the overwhelming result, nondischargeability, belie that 
theory. In fact, the third standard generally prevails. Bank-
ruptcy judges have been swayed by an opinion shared by lend-
ers, a number of members of Congress, and the public at large: 
bankruptcy is inherently unfair to unsecured creditors. In the 
end, the controversy surrounding student loans in bankruptcy 
may be characterized by one dominant theme: hostility to the 
basic premise of bankruptcy-forgiveness of debt. 
Depicting the legislative and judicial approaches as retalia-
tory or vindictive is, perhaps, overly harsh. It is necessary to 
separate the result-nondischargeability-from the rhetoric and 
the theory. The result is sound for it comports with a fundamen-
tal governmental interest-the maintenance of ongoing assis-
tance to students of higher education. The purpose of the fed-
eral student loan program is twofold: [1] ensuring a sufficient 
supply of well trained, competent professional and technical per-
sonnel, and [2] allowing every person the fullest possible educa-
tional opportunity by making loans available to those who would 
not otherwise obtain a loan because of their age, lack of collat-
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eral, or borrowing history.l08 These are worthy objectives that 
are clearly subverted by the discharge of student loans in bank-
ruptcy. Even though the statistics do not indicate that bank-
ruptcy filings were ever a great problem in terms of absolute dol-
lars, they clearly remain a problem in a political sense. As the 
legislative history indicates, even an ill-perceived abuse may be 
as significant as actual abuse in terms of its impact on congres-
sional willingness to fund a student loan program. In sum, Con-
gress did not go far enough in its treatment of student loans in 
bankruptcy. Student loans should be nondischargeable alto-
gether-regardless of hardship and the period of time elapsed.l09 
The debtor is already adequately protected from the spectre of 
debtor's prison or involuntary servitude through a program of 
forbearance built into the administration of the student loan 
program. The interests of future generations of students demand 
that their predecessors' promises be kept. 
108. S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36, reprintea in [1965] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & An. NEWS 4027, 4053. 
109. Because student loans are repaid over a ten year period, a student now may 
discharge one-half of the obligation at the end of five years. 
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